The National Transportation Safety Board on January 27, 2026, held a hearing in Washington, D.C., to adopt formal probable cause findings into the midair collision between a PSA Airlines CRJ700 and a US Army Black Hawk helicopter near Washington’s Reagan National Airport (DCA). The Safety Board concluded that a cascade of systemic failures—not any single mistake—led to one of the deadliest US aviation accidents in more than two decades.
The January 29, 2025, collision killed all 67 people aboard both aircraft, including passengers, crew members, and the helicopter’s military pilots. Among the victims were 28 members of the figure skating community, along with their families, who were returning from a national development camp in Wichita, Kansas.
The NTSB’s findings, presented during a day-long public board meeting in Washington, placed responsibility squarely on flawed airspace design, inadequate oversight, and breakdowns in air traffic control and helicopter operations—while explicitly finding that the pilots of the PSA regional jet were not at fault.
“This was preventable,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said, describing long-standing risks that went unaddressed despite years of warnings.
What happened
On the night of the crash, the PSA Airlines CRJ700, operating as American Eagle Flight 5342, was arriving from Wichita and had been cleared to land on Runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. At the same time, a US Army UH-60 Black Hawk was flying a published helicopter route along the Potomac River.
Investigators found the helicopter was flying higher than allowed for that route, placing it directly in the path of arriving jet traffic. The helicopter crew requested and was granted visual separation from the jet—a decision the NTSB said should never have been approved under the circumstances.
The local controller, handling both helicopter and airline traffic, did not issue a safety alert or advise the jet crew of the helicopter’s position. The NTSB found the controller’s workload had increased rapidly and that a “make it work” culture had normalized unsafe operations in the congested airspace.
The two aircraft collided at night over the river and plunged into icy water. There were no survivors.
The NTSB concluded the crash resulted from multiple failures across organizations, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Army, and air traffic control operations at Reagan National.
Investigators said the crash grew out of an airspace design that placed helicopter routes dangerously close to jet arrival paths, in some cases providing as little as 75 feet of vertical separation. Despite years of data showing repeated close calls between helicopters and commercial aircraft, the FAA declined multiple recommendations to move or redesign those routes.
Systemic failures
The board also found that controllers had become overly reliant on visual separation, even at night in dense urban airspace where spotting other aircraft is difficult. On the night of the crash, the local controller was handling a mix of airline and helicopter traffic without adequate safeguards, a workload that investigators said reduced situational awareness at a critical moment.
Compounding the risk, the Army helicopter was not broadcasting its position using ADS-B, limiting what controllers and other pilots could see. Investigators also pointed to poor coordination and incomplete sharing of safety data between the FAA and the Army, which left known risks unaddressed.
Throughout the hearing, investigators emphasized that the PSA Airlines flight crew followed all procedures and never received information that would have allowed them to detect or avoid the helicopter before the collision.
Investigators said the PSA CRJ700 flight crew followed all procedures, were not advised of the helicopter’s position or issued a safety alert, and were placed in a situation where no reasonable action was available to avoid the collision.
Changes already underway
In response to the crash, the FAA has permanently closed the helicopter route involved in the collision, except for limited essential operations. The agency has also reduced arrival rates at Reagan National and increased tower staffing.
The NTSB said those steps were necessary but overdue.
The board also highlighted the ROTOR Act, pending legislation that would require military and government helicopters to carry ADS-B equipment and keep it activated in shared airspace. Investigators said the technology could have provided collision alerts up to a minute before impact.
The Justice Department has already acknowledged federal liability in the case, citing failures to meet basic duties of care.
Board members warned that the conditions that led to the crash are not unique to Washington. Homendy said other airports with mixed helicopter and airline traffic pose similar risks if systemic issues remain unresolved.
The NTSB is expected to release its full final report in the coming weeks.