Charter firms accused of price gouging during Dubai evacuation chaos

Business Aviation Emirates-Dubai-Connect
Emirates

When missiles and one-way attack drones began raining down on the United Arab Emirates in the opening hours of the Iran war, panic spread quickly among executives, tourists, and expatriates in Dubai. Within hours, private aviation companies began receiving a flood of requests from people desparately trying to leave the region.   

Kyle Patel, founder of global charter brokerage Bitlux, said his company alone received more than 500 evacuation requests in the first hours after hostilities began.   

What followed, he said, was one of the most chaotic, and ethically troubling, charter markets he has seen in his career.   

“Costs can go up in a crisis. That’s understandable,” Patel said in an interview. “But some of what we saw went far beyond that. It crossed into blatant price gouging.”   

One client, he said, was charged roughly $700,000 for a private jet evacuation flight out of the region that under more normal circumstances would likely cost closer to $150,000, even allowing for use of a long-range aircraft.   

Few ways out

Demand for private flights surged almost immediately after the attacks began. Many travelers initially hoped the exchange of strikes would remain limited and that commercial airline service would continue operating. But as retaliatory attacks escalated and airspace restrictions spread across the Middle East, private aviation became one of the few remaining options for those trying to leave quickly.   

Dubai sits in a complex airspace environment surrounded by multiple flight information regions, or FIRs, which function as controlled corridors for aircraft similar to interstate highways for ground traffic. Early in the crisis, the United Arab Emirates’ FIR was effectively closed to most operations, while parts of northeastern Saudi airspace were unavailable for flight planning.   

Bitlux quickly began analyzing alternate routes using a combination of operational planning and an internal AI monitoring system that scans NOTAMs and airspace notices across multiple countries.   

The company determined within hours of the start of hostilities on February 28, 2026, that the most viable evacuation path was not directly by air from Dubai, but first by road to Oman.   

The plan involved driving passengers south from Dubai to the border with Oman, crossing into the country by car, and then flying out of Muscat International Airport, where airspace remained open.   

“We realized Oman’s FIR was still available,” Patel said. “If we could get people across the border, we could get airplanes in.”   

By around 9 p.m. on the first day of the conflict, Bitlux had established a workable routing plan: flights could depart Muscat, fly along western Saudi Arabian airspace, cross near Cairo, and continue on to destinations in Europe or Turkey, including Istanbul.   
 
Within roughly eight hours of the initial strikes, the company had arranged drivers, coordinated border logistics, and made contact with individuals familiar with the immigration process in Oman.   

The first passenger reached the Oman border around 3 a.m., and the evacuation pipeline was operating within roughly 12 hours of the first attacks, Patel said.

But the window quickly narrowed. Once Omani authorities saw the surge of cross-border traffic, they stopped allowing non-Omani vehicles through the checkpoint. Passengers arriving from Dubai had to transfer to Omani vehicles waiting on the other side before continuing on to Muscat airport.   

Even when aircraft were available, arranging flights proved difficult.   

Many long-range aircraft capable of evacuation flights were located far from the Gulf region and had to reposition from other continents. Wartime risk insurance also became a major factor, with some operators requiring new coverage before entering the region.

Patel estimates that only about 15 aircraft in the broader area were realistically capable of performing many of the longer evacuation flights people were requesting.   

Capitalizing on a panic

The rush to leave the region pushed charter demand sharply higher. Brokers reported requests arriving every few minutes in the early days of the conflict, while some operators doubled prices for common routes such as Dubai to Istanbul as aircraft and airport slots became scarce. Many travelers also began driving across the border into Oman or Saudi Arabia and departing from Muscat or Riyadh as airspace restrictions complicated departures from the UAE.  

That limited supply pushed prices higher across the market. But Patel said some operators and intermediaries appeared to go well beyond legitimate increases tied to repositioning, permits, insurance, and other wartime operating costs.  

In one case, he said, passengers had already reached the Oman border and completed payment documentation for a flight when the operator contacted the broker again.   

“They told us, ‘We have to do what’s best for our company. We need another $70,000,’” Patel said.   

The final bill for that flight, a Gulfstream IV trip to Nice, France, ultimately reached about $260,000, he said.   

Other quotes were far higher. Patel said he saw long-range evacuation quotes ranging from $300,000 to $700,000, figures he believed in some cases exceeded what could reasonably be explained by repositioning, permitting, insurance, and routing constraints.   

He said the worst examples appeared to involve operators or intermediaries trying to capitalize on panic in the market, especially when clients had few realistic alternatives once airspace closures and border bottlenecks began to spread.   

Managing through the chaos

The turmoil in the charter market reflected the broader breakdown of aviation operations across the region during the early days of the conflict.   

Radar and tracking anomalies were observed across parts of the Middle East, including areas north of Israel and sections of Saudi Arabia. Some aircraft appeared on flight-tracking systems to jump suddenly by 100 to 200 miles from their actual positions due to disruptions affecting radar or transponder signals, assumed to be caused by US military spoofing and jamming.   

Bitlux used an internal monitoring platform called the Bitlux Intelligent Assistant, or BIA, to help track the rapidly evolving situation. The AI system scanned airspace notifications, FIR closures, and NOTAM updates every five minutes across roughly 10 countries in the region.

The information fed into a command-center-style dashboard that tracked aircraft tail numbers, departure times, fuel stops, and route changes in real time.   

“It looked like planes were jumping all over the map at times,” Patel said. “There were definitely areas where radar coverage was disrupted.”   

Despite the chaos, Bitlux ultimately arranged seven evacuation flights during the first days of the conflict. Patel estimates that most of the attempted charter evacuations across the region never materialized due to logistics, permit delays, airspace restrictions, or crew duty limits.   

Demand for evacuation flights has since fallen sharply as the initial panic subsided and commercial airline service gradually resumed limited operations into and out of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.   

Still, Patel said the episode revealed how vulnerable the private charter market can become during a crisis.   

“In a situation like that, people are scared and they’re desperate to get out,” he said. “That’s exactly when companies need to act responsibly. You can’t just throw logic out the window because there’s panic in the market.”   

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